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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
LTE;
Security of Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) over LTE
(3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13)
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3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13 1 ETSI TS 133 179 V13.7.0 (2018-10)
Reference
RTS/TSGS-0333179vd70
Keywords
LTE,SECURITY
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3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13 2 ETSI TS 133 179 V13.7.0 (2018-10)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
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Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or
GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables.
The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under
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Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
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3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13 3 ETSI TS 133 179 V13.7.0 (2018-10)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 2
Foreword . 2
Modal verbs terminology . 2
Foreword . 7
1 Scope . 8
2 References . 8
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 9
3.1 Definitions . 9
3.2 Abbreviations . 10
4 Overview of MCPTT security . 10
4.1 General . 10
4.2 Signalling plane security architecture. 10
4.3 Application plane security architecture . 11
4.3.1 General . 11
4.3.2 User authentication and authorisation . 11
4.3.3 Identity keying of users and services . 12
4.3.4 Protection of application plane signalling . 13
4.3.5 Media security . 13
4.3.5.1 General . 13
4.3.5.2 Media security for group communications. . 13
4.3.5.3 Media security for private calls . 15
5 Authentication and authorization . 16
5.1 General . 16
5.2 LTE access authentication and security mechanism. 17
5.3 Authentication for SIP core access . 17
5.4 Authentication for HTTP-1 . 17
5.5 User authentication . 17
5.5.1 Identity management functional model . 17
5.5.2 User authentication framework . 18
5.5.3 OpenID Connect (OIDC) . 19
5.5.3.1 General . 19
5.5.3.2 User authentication example using Username/Password . 21
5.6 MCPTT user authorization . 21
5.6.1 General . 21
5.6.2 MCPTT user service authorization with MCPTT Server. 23
5.6.2.0 General . 23
5.6.2.1 Using SIP REGISTER . 23
5.6.2.2 Using SIP PUBLISH . 24
6 Signalling plane protection . 25
6.1 SIP-1 interface security . 25
6.2 HTTP-1 interface security . 25
7 End-to-end communication security . 25
7.1 Overview . 25
7.2 Key provisioning and management . 26
7.2.1 General . 26
7.2.2 Functional model for key management . 26
7.2.2.0 General . 26
7.2.2.1 Reference point CSC-8 (between key management server and the key management client within
the MCPTT UE) . 27
7.2.2.2 Reference point CSC-9 (between the key management server and the key management client
within the MCPTT Server) . 27
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3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13 4 ETSI TS 133 179 V13.7.0 (2018-10)
7.2.2.3 Reference point CSC-10 (between the key management server and the key management client
within a group management server) . 27
7.2.3 Security procedures for key management . 27
7.2.4 Provisioned key material to support end-to-end communication security . 28
7.3 Group call key distribution . 29
7.3.1 General . 29
7.3.2 Security procedures for GMK provisioning . 31
7.3.3 Key Identification and purpose tags. 32
7.3.4 Group creation procedure . 32
7.3.5 Dynamic group keying . 32
7.3.5.1 General . 32
7.3.5.2 Group regrouping procedures (within a single MCPTT system) . 33
7.3.5.3 Group regrouping procedures (involving multiple MCPTT systems) . 33
7.3.6 Derivation of SRTP/SRTCP master keys . 34
7.3.7 Group member GMK management . 34
7.4 Private call key distribution . 35
7.4.1 General . 35
7.4.2 Security procedures (on-network) . 36
7.4.3 Security procedures (off-network) . 37
7.4.4 Derivation of SRTP/SRTCP master keys . 38
7.4.5 Void . 39
7.5 Protection of media stream (SRTP) . 39
7.5.1 General . 39
7.5.2 Security procedures for media stream protection. 40
7.6 Protection of offline floor and media control signalling (SRTCP) . 41
7.6.1 General . 41
7.6.2 Security procedures for offline floor and media control protection . 42
7.7 Protection of MBMS subchannel control messages (SRTCP) . 43
7.7.1 General . 43
7.7.2 Key distribution . 43
7.7.3 Derivation of SRTCP master keys . 44
8 Inter/Intra domain interface security . 45
8.1 General . 45
9 Protection of floor control and sensitive application signalling . 45
9.1 Key agreement for protection of floor control and sensitive application data (Client to Server) . 45
9.1.1 Identity-based key management for Client Server Key (CSK) . 45
9.1.2 Creation of the CSK . 46
9.1.3 Secure distribution of the CSK . 46
9.1.3.0 General . 46
9.1.3.1 MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE . 46
9.1.3.2 Distribution of CSK during MCPTT Service Authorization and group subscription . 47
9.1.3.3 Obtaining CSK from the I_MESSAGE. 47
9.1.3.4 Procedure . 47
9.2 Key agreement for protection of floor control and sensitive application data between servers . 48
9.3 Protection of XML content . 49
9.3.1 General . 49
9.3.2 Protected content . 49
9.3.3 Key agreement . 50
9.3.4 Confidentiality protection using XML encryption (xmlenc) . 50
9.3.4.1 General . 50
9.3.4.2 XML content encryption . 50
9.3.4.3 XML URI attribute encryption . 51
9.3.5 Integrity protection using XML signature (xmlsig) . 52
9.4 Key agreement for online floor control (SRTCP) . 53
9.4.1 General . 53
9.4.2 Key agreement between MCPTT client and MCPTT Server . 53
9.4.3 Key agreement between MCPTT Servers . 53
9.4.4 Key agreement for multicast from MCPTT Server . 53
9.4.5 Derivation of SRTCP key material . 53
Annex A (normative): Security requirements . 55
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3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13 5 ETSI TS 133 179 V13.7.0 (2018-10)
A.0 Introduction . 55
A.1 Configuration & service access . 55
A.2 Group key management. 55
A.3 On-network operation. 55
A.4 Ambient listening . 56
A.5 Data communication between MCPTT network entities . 56
A.6 Key stream re-use . 56
A.7 Late entry to group communication . 56
A.8 Private call confidentiality . 57
A.9 Off-network operation . 57
A.10 Privacy of MCPTT identities . 57
A.11 User authentication and authorization requirements . 58
Annex B (normative): OpenID connect profile for MCPTT . 59
B.0 General . 59
B.1 MCPTT tokens . 59
B.1.1 ID token . 59
B.1.1.0 General . 59
B.1.1.1 Standard claims . 59
B.1.1.2 MCPTT claims . 59
B.1.2 Access token . 60
B.1.2.0 Introduction. 60
B.1.2.1 Standard claims . 60
B.1.2.2 MCPTT claims . 60
B.2 MCPTT client registration. 60
B.3 Obtaining tokens . 60
B.3.0 General . 60
B.3.1 Native MCPTT client . 61
B.3.1.0 General . 61
B.3.1.1 Authentication Request . 61
B.3.1.2 Authentication response . 62
B.3.1.3 Token request . 63
B.3.1.4 Token Response . 63
B.4 Refreshing an access token . 64
B.4.0 General . 64
B.4.1 Access token request . 64
B.4.2 Access token response . 65
B.5 Using the token to access MCPTT resource servers . 65
B.6 Token validation . 66
B.6.1 ID token validation . 66
B.6.2 Access token validation . 66
Annex C (informative): OpenID connect detailed flow . 67
C.1 Detailed flow for MCPTT user authentication and registration using OpenID Connect . 67
Annex D (Normative): KMS provisioning messages to support MCPTT . 69
D.1 General aspects . 69
D.2 KMS requests . 69
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3GPP TS 33.179 version 13.7.0 Release 13 6 ETSI TS 133 179 V13.7.0 (2018-10)
D.3 KMS responses . 70
D.3.0 General . 70
D.3.1 KMS certificates . 70
D.3.1.1 Description .
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