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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
LTE;
Network Domain Security (NDS);
Authentication Framework (AF)
(3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15)
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 1 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
Reference
RTS/TSGS-0333310vf10
Keywords
LTE,SECURITY,UMTS
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 2 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
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Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or
GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables.
The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under
.
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
ETSI
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 3 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 2
Foreword . 2
Modal verbs terminology . 2
Foreword . 6
Introduction . 6
1 Scope . 7
2 References . 8
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 9
3.1 Definitions . 9
3.2 Abbreviations . 10
4 Introduction to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . 10
4.1 Manual Cross-certification . 10
4.2 Cross-certification with a Bridge CA . 11
5 Architecture and use cases of the NDS/AF . 11
5.1 PKI architecture for NDS/AF . 11
5.1.1 General architecture . 12
5.1.1.1 NDS/IP case . 12
5.1.1.2 TLS case . 13
5.2 Use cases . 14
5.2.1 Operator Registration: Creation of interconnect agreement . 14
5.2.2 Establishment of secure communications . 16
5.2.2.1 NDS/IP case . 16
5.2.2.1.1 NDS/IP case for the Za inter fa ce . 16
5.2.2.1.2 NDS/IP case for the Zb-interface . 16
5.2.2.2 TLS case . 17
5.2.3 Operator deregistration: Termination of interconnect agreement . 18
5.2.3a Interconnection CA registration . 18
5.2.3b Interconnection CA deregistration . 18
5.2.3c Interconnection CA certification creation . 18
5.2.3d Interconnection CA certification revocation . 19
5.2.3e Interconnection CA certification renewal . 19
5.2.4 SEG/TLS CA registration . 19
5.2.5 SEG/TLS CA deregistration . 19
5.2.6 SEG/TLS CA certificate creation . 19
5.2.7 SEG/TLS CA certificate revocation . 19
5.2.8 SEG/TLS CA certificate renewal . 20
5.2.9 End entity registration . 20
5.2.9.1 SEG registration . 20
5.2.9.2 TLS client registration . 20
5.2.9.3 TLS server registration . 20
5.2.9.4 NE registration . 20
5.2.10 End entity deregistration . 20
5.2.10.1 SEG deregistration . 20
5.2.10.2 TLS client deregistration . 21
5.2.10.3 TLS server deregistration . 21
5.2.10.4 NE deregistration . 21
5.2.11 End entity certificate creation . 21
5.2.12 End entity certificate revocation . 21
5.2.13 End entity certificate renewal . 21
5.2.14 NE CA deregistration. 21
5.2.15 NE CA certification creation . 21
5.2.16 NE CA certificate revocation . 21
5.2.17 NE CA certificate renewal . 22
ETSI
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 4 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
6 Profiling . 22
6.1 Certificate profiles . 22
6.1.1 Common rules to all certificates . 22
6.1.2 Interconnection CA Certificate profile . 23
6.1.3 SEG Certificate profile . 23
6.1.3a TLS entity certificate profile . 24
6.1.3b NE Certificate profile. 24
6.1.4 SEG CA certificate profile . 24
6.1.4a TLS client/server CA certificate profile . 24
6.1.4b NE CA certificate profile . 25
6.1a CRL profile . 25
6.2 IKE negotiation and profiling . 25
6.2.1 Void . 25
6.2.1b IKEv2 profile . 25
6.2.2 Potential interoperability issues . 26
6.2a TLS profiling . 26
6.2a.1 TLS profile. 26
6.2a.2 Potential interoperability issues . 26
6.3 Path validation . 27
6.3.1 Path validation profiling . 27
7 Detailed description of architecture and mechanisms . 27
7.1 Repositories . 27
7.2 Life cycle management . 30
7.3 Cross-certification . 31
7.4 Revoking a SEG/TLS CA cross-certificate . 31
7.5 Establishing secure connections between NDS/IP end entities using IKE on the Za interface . 31
7.5a Establishing secure connections using TLS . 32
7.5b Establishing secure connections between NDS/IP entities on the Zb interface . 32
7.6 CRL management . 32
8 Backward compatibility for NDS/IP NE's and SEGs . 33
9 Certificate enrolment for base stations . 34
9.1 General . 34
9.2 Architecture . 34
9.3 Security Mechanisms . 35
9.4 Certificate Profiles . 35
9.4.1 General . 35
9.4.2 Vendor Root CA Certificate . 35
9.4.3 Vendor CA Certificate . 35
9.4.4 Vendor Base Station Certificate . 35
9.4.5 Operator Root CA Certificate . 36
9.4.6 Operator RA/CA Certificate . 36
9.4.7 Intermediate Operator CA Certificate . 36
9.4.8 Operator Base Station Certificate . 36
9.5 CMPv2 Profiling . 37
9.5.1 General Requirements . 37
9.5.2 Profile for the PKIMessage . 37
9.5.3 Profile for the PKIHeader Field . 38
9.5.4 Profile for the PKIBody Field . 38
9.5.4.1 General . 38
9.5.4.2 Initialization Request . 38
9.5.4.3 Initialization Response . 39
9.5.4.4 Key Update Request and Key Update Response . 39
9.5.4.5 Certificate Confirm Request and Confirmation Response . 40
9.6 CMPv2 Transport . 40
Annex A (informative): Void . 41
Annex B (informative): Decision for the simple trust model . 42
B.1 Introduction . 42
ETSI
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 5 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
B.2 Requirements for trust model in NDS/AF . 42
B.3 Cross-certification approaches . 42
B.3.1 Manual Cross-certification . 42
B.3.2 Cross-certification with a Bridge CA . 43
B.4 Issues with the Bridge CA approach . 43
B.4.1 Need for nameConstraint support in certificates or strong legal bindings and auditing . 43
B.4.2 Preventing name collisions . 44
B.4.3 Two redundant steps required for establishing trust . 44
B.4.4 Long certificate chains connected with IKE implementation issues . 44
B.4.5 Lack of existing relevant Bridge CA experiences . 44
B.5 Feasibility of the direct cross-certification approach . 45
B.5.1 Benefits of direct cross-certification. 45
B.5.2 Memory and processing power requirements . 45
B.5.3 Shortcomings . 46
B.5.4 Possible evolution path to a Bridge CA. 46
Annex C (informative): Decision for the CRL repository access protocol for SEGs . 47
Annex D (informative): Decision for storing the cross-certificates in CR . 48
Annex E (normative): TLS protocol profile . 49
Annex F (informative): Manual handling of TLS certificates. 50
F.0 General . 50
F.1 TLS certificate enrolment . 50
F.2 TLS Certificate revocation . 50
Annex G (informative): Example CMPv2 Message Flow for Initial Enrolment. 51
Annex H (informative): Guidance on eNB Certificate Enrolment in MOCN LTE RAN
sharing . 53
Annex I (informative): Change history . 54
History . 56
ETSI
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 6 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
Foreword
rd
This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal
TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an
identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
Version x.y.z
where:
x the first digit:
1 presented to TSG for information;
2 presented to TSG for approval;
3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
Introduction
For 3GPP systems there is a need for truly scalable entity Authentication Framework (AF) since an increasing number
of network elements and interfaces are covered by security mechanisms.
This specification provides a highly scalable entity authentication framework for 3GPP network nodes. This framework
is developed in the context of the Network Domain Security work item, which effectively limits the scope to the control
plane entities of the core network. Thus, the Authentication Framework will provide entity authentication for the nodes
that are using NDS/IP.
Feasible trust models (i.e. how CAs are organized) and their effects are provided. Additionally, requirements are
presented for the used protocols and certificate profiles, to make it possible for operator IPsec and PKI implementations
to interoperate.
ETSI
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3GPP TS 33.310 version 15.1.0 Release 15 7 ETSI TS 133 310 V15.1.0 (2018-10)
1 Scope
The scope of this Technical Specification is limited to authentication of network elements, which are using NDS/IP or
TLS, and to Certificate Enrolment for Base Stations as described in the present document.
In the case of NDS/IP this specification includes both the authentication of Security Gateways (SEG) at the
corresponding Za-interfaces and the authentication between NEs and between NEs and SEGs at the Zb-interface.
Authentication of end entities (i.e. NEs and SEGs) in the intra-operator domain is considered an internal issue for
operators. This is quite much in line with [1] which states that only Za is mandatory and that the security domain
operator can decide if the Zb-interface is deployed or not, as the Zb-interface is optional for implementation. Validity of
certificates may be restricted to the operator's domain in case of Zb interface or in case of Za-interface between two
security domains of the same operator.
NOTE: In case two SEGs interconnect separate network regions under a single administrative authority (e.g.
owned by the same mobile operator) then the Za-interface is not subject to interconnect agreements, but
the decision on applying Za-interface is left to operators.
The NDS architecture for IP-based protocols is illustrated in figure 1.
Security Domain A Security Domain B
NE NE
A-1 B-1
Zb
Zb
Za
Zb Zb
SEG SEG
A B
Zb Zb
NE NE
A-2 B-2
IKE "connection"
ESP tunnel
Figure 1: NDS architecture for IP-
...