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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);
Testing;
Conformance test specifications for ITS PKI management;
Part 2: Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP)
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2 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
Reference
DTS/ITS-00546
Keywords
ITS, security, testing, TSS&TP
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3 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Modal verbs terminology . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
2.1 Normative references . 6
2.2 Informative references . 6
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Terms . 7
3.2 Symbols . 7
3.3 Abbreviations . 7
4 Test Suite Structure (TSS) . 8
4.1 Structure for Security tests . 8
4.2 Test entities and states . 8
4.2.1 ITS-S states . 8
4.2.2 EA states . 9
4.2.3 AA states . 9
4.2.4 RootCA states . 9
4.2.5 TLM states . 9
4.3 Test configurations . 10
4.3.1 Overview . 10
4.3.2 Enrolment . 10
4.3.2.1 Configuration CFG_ENR_ITSS . 10
4.3.2.2 Configuration CFG_ENR_EA . 10
4.3.3 Authorization . 10
4.3.3.1 Configuration CFG_AUTH_ITSS . 10
4.3.3.2 Configuration CFG_AUTH_AA . 10
4.3.4 Authorization Validation . 11
4.3.4.1 Configuration CFG_AVALID_AA . 11
4.3.4.2 Configuration CFG_AVALID_EA . 11
4.3.5 CA certificate generation . 11
4.3.5.1 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_INIT . 11
4.3.5.2 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_REKEY . 11
4.3.5.3 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_RCA . 11
4.3.6 ECTL generation . 11
4.3.6.1 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_TLM . 11
4.3.6.2 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_CPOC. 12
4.3.7 Root CTL generation . 12
4.3.7.1 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_RCA . 12
4.3.8 CRL generation . 12
4.3.8.1 Configuration CFG_CRLGEN_RCA. 12
5 Test Purposes (TP) . 12
5.1 Introduction . 12
5.1.1 TP definition conventions . 12
5.1.2 TP Identifier naming conventions . 12
5.1.3 Rules for the behaviour description . 13
5.1.4 Sources of TP definitions . 13
5.1.5 Mnemonics for PICS reference . 13
5.2 ITS-S behaviour . 14
5.2.0 Overview . 14
5.2.1 Manufacturing . 14
5.2.2 Enrolment . 14
5.2.2.0 Overview . 14
5.2.2.1 Enrolment request . 14
ETSI
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4 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
5.2.2.2 Enrolment response handling . 20
5.2.3 Authorization . 20
5.2.3.0 Overview . 20
5.2.3.1 Authorization request . 21
5.2.3.2 Authorization response handling . 28
5.2.4 CTL handling . 29
5.2.5 CRL handling. 30
5.3 EA behaviour . 30
5.3.1 Enrolment request handling . 30
5.3.2 Enrolment response. 31
5.3.3 Authorization validation request handling . 36
5.3.4 Authorization validation response . 37
5.3.5 CA Certificate Request . 41
5.4 AA behaviour . 46
5.4.1 Authorization request handling . 46
5.4.2 Authorization validation request . 50
5.4.3 Authorization validation response handling . 54
5.4.4 Authorization response . 55
5.4.5 CA Certificate Request . 59
5.5 RootCA beha viour . 64
5.5.1 CTL generation . 64
5.5.2 CRL generation . 74
5.5.3 CA certificate generation . 78
5.6 DC behaviour . 80
5.7 TLM behavior . 81
5.7.1 CTL generation . 81
5.8 CPOC behavior . 87
History . 88
ETSI
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5 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Trademarks
The present document may include trademarks and/or tradenames which are asserted and/or registered by their owners.
ETSI claims no ownership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no
right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does
not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks.
Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Intelligent Transport Systems
(ITS).
The present document is part 2 of a multi-part deliverable. Full details of the entire series can be found in part 1 [4].
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
ETSI
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6 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
1 Scope
The present document provides the Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP) for PKI management as defined
in ETSI TS 102 941 [1] in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.6].
The ISO standard for the methodology of conformance testing (ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.3] and ISO/IEC 9646-2 [i.4]) as well
as the ETSI rules for conformance testing (ETSI ETS 300 406 [i.7]) are used as a basis for the test methodology.
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI TS 102 941 (V1.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Trust and Privacy
Management".
[2] ETSI TS 103 097 (V1.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and
certificate formats".
[3] IEEE Std 1609.2™-2016: "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments -
Security Services for Applications and Management Messages", as amended by IEEE
Std 1609.2a™-2017: "Standard for Wireless Access In Vehicular Environments - Security
Services for Applications and Management Messages Amendment 1".
[4] ETSI TS 103 525-1 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test
specifications for ITS PKI management; Part 1: Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
(PICS)".
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.1] ETSI EG 202 798 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Framework for
conformance and interoperability testing".
[i.2] ETSI TS 102 965 (V1.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Application Object Identifier
(ITS-AID); Registration".
[i.3] ISO/IEC 9646-1 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection --
Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 1: General concepts".
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7 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
[i.4] ISO/IEC 9646-2 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection --
Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 2: Abstract Test Suite specification".
[i.5] ISO/IEC 9646-6 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection --
Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 6: Protocol profile test specification".
[i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-7 (1995): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection --
Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 7: Implementation Conformance
Statements".
[i.7] ETSI ETS 300 406 (1995): "Methods for testing and Specification (MTS); Protocol and profile
conformance testing specifications; Standardization methodology".
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 102 941 [1], ETSI TS 103 097 [2], ETSI
TS 103 525-1 [4], ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2], ISO/IEC 9646-6 [i.5], ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.6] and the following apply:
AID_CERT_REQ "Secured certificate request service" ITS-AID
AID_CTL "CTL service" ITS-AID
AID_CRL "CRL service" ITS-AID
3.2 Symbols
Void.
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AA Authorization Authority
AID Application IDentifier
AID_CAM ITS Application IDentifier for CAM
AID_DENM Application Identifier for DENM
AID_GN Application Identifier for general GeoNetworking messages
AT Authorization Ticket
ATS Abstract Test Suite
BO exceptional BehaviOur
BV Valid Behaviour
CAM Co-operative Awareness Messages
CERT CERTificate
DENM Decentralized Environmental Notification Message
EA Enrolment Authority
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
GN GeoNetworking
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
ITS-S Intelligent Transport System - Station
IUT Implementation Under Test
MSG MesSaGe
PICS Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
SSP Service Specific Permissions
TP Test Purposes
TS Test System
TSS Test Suite Structure
ETSI
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8 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
4 Test Suite Structure (TSS)
4.1 Structure for Security tests
Table 1 shows the Security Test Suite Structure (TSS) defined for conformance testing.
Table 1: TSS for Security Management
Root Group Sub-Group Category
Security Management ITS-S Enrolment Valid
Authorization Valid
CRL handling Valid
CTL handling Valid
EA Enrolment Valid
Authorization Validation Valid
CA certificate generation Valid
CRL handling Valid
CTL handling Valid
AA Authorization Valid
Authorization Validation Valid
CA certificate generation Valid
CRL handling Valid
CTL handling Valid
RootCA CA certificate generation Valid
CTL/CRL generation Valid
DC CTL/CRL distribution Valid
TLM ECTL generation Valid
TLM certificate generation Valid
CPOC ECTL distribution Valid
4.2 Test entities and states
4.2.1 ITS-S states
• State 'initialized':
- ITS-S in 'initialized' state is ready to perform the enrolment request.
- ITS-S in 'initialized' state contains following information elements:
permanent canonical identifier (PCI);
public/private key pair for cryptographic purposes (canonical key pair);
the trust anchor (Root CA) public key certificate and the DC network address;
contact information for the EA which will issue certificates for the ITS-S:
- network address;
- public key certificate.
• State 'enrolled':
- ITS-S in 'enrolled' state has successfully performed the enrolment request process.
- ITS-S in 'enrolled' state is ready to perform an authorization request.
- ITS-S in 'enrolled' state contains all information elements of the 'initialized' state and additionally:
enrolment credential (EC) - with the condition of being neither expired nor revoked;
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9 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
private key corresponding to the EC public encryption key;
private key corresponding to the EC public verification key.
• State 'authorized':
- ITS-S in 'authorized' state has successfully performed the authorization request process.
- ITS-S in 'authorized' state contains all information elements of the 'enrolled' state and additionally:
one or more authorization tickets (AT):
- being not expired;
- of which at least one is currently valid;
all private keys corresponding to the AT public verification keys;
if applicable: all private keys corresponding to the AT public encryption keys.
4.2.2 EA states
• State 'initial':
- EA contains following information elements:
the trust anchor (Root CA) public key certificate and the DC network address.
• State 'operational':
- EA is ready to receive enrolment requests from ITS-S.
- In addition to information elements enumerated in the 'initial' state, EA in the 'operational' state contains
following information elements:
public/private key pairs and EA certificate permitting issuing of enrolment certificates.
4.2.3 AA states
• State 'initial':
- AA in initial state contains following information elements:
the trust anchor (Root CA) public key certificate and the DC network address;
• State 'operational':
- public/private key pairs and AA certificate permitting issuing of authorization tickets (AT certificates);
- root CTL containing trusted EA certificates;
- the EA access point URL.
4.2.4 RootCA states
• State 'operational':
- RootCA is offline, but can generate CRL, CTL, AA, EA, RCA, etc. certificates by manual request.
4.2.5 TLM states
• State 'operational':
- TLM is offline, but can generate ECTL by manual request.
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10 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
4.3 Test configurations
4.3.1 Overview
4.3.2 Enrolment
4.3.2.1 Configuration CFG_ENR_ITSS
IUT: ITS-S in the state 'initialized':
• Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the EA emulated by the TS.
- permanent canonical identifier (PCI);
- public key of canonical key pair;
- profile information.
TS: EA is emulated by TS.
4.3.2.2 Configuration CFG_ENR_EA
IUT: EA is in the state 'operational', ready to handle enrolment requests and contains following information about
ITS-S emulated by the TS:
• the permanent canonical identifier of the emulated ITS-S;
• the profile information for the emulated ITS-S;
• the public key from the canonical key pair belonging to the emulated ITS-S.
TS: ITS-S is emulated by the TS.
4.3.3 Authorization
4.3.3.1 Configuration CFG_AUTH_ITSS
IUT: ITS-S in the state 'enrolled' and containing following information:
• the AA certificate of the emulated AA;
• the EA certificate of the emulated EA;
• the EC certificate issued by the emulated EA.
The URL of the emulated AATS: AA is emulated by the TS.
4.3.3.2 Configuration CFG_AUTH_AA
IUT: AA in the operational state and containing following information:
• The profile information for the emulated ITS-S.
TS: ITS-S is emulated by the TS:
• EA is emulated by the TS and validates all incoming requests.
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11 ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.1.1 (2019-03)
4.3.4 Authorization Validation
4.3.4.1 Configuration CFG_AVALID_AA
IUT: AA in the operational state and containing following information:
• the certificate of the emulated EA;
• the URL of the emulated EA.
TS: EA is emulated by the TS and ready to receive authorization validation requests:
• ITS-S is emulated by TS to trigger the authorization process.
4.3.4.2 Configuration CFG_AVALID_EA
IUT: EA is in the operational state, ready to handle authorization validation requests and contains following
information about AA and ITS-S emulated by the TS:
• the permanent canonical identifier of the emulated ITS-S;
• the profile information for the emulated ITS-S;
• the public key from the key pair belonging to the emulated ITS-S.
TS: AA and ITS-S are emulated by the TS and contain following information elements:
• EC certificate issued by IUT;
• EA certificate of IUT;
• the URL of the EA.
4.3.5 CA certificate generation
4.3.5.1 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_INIT
IUT: CA (EA or AA) in the initial state
TS: TS checks generated certificate requests and does not emulate any ITS entity
4.3.5.2 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
IUT: CA (EA or AA) in the operational state
TS: TS checks generated certificate requests and does not emulate any ITS entity
4.3.5.3 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_RCA
IUT: Offline RootCA in operational state, generating EA, AA or RCA certificate
TS: TS checks generated certificate and does not emulate any ITS entity
4.3.6 ECTL generation
4.3.6.1 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
IUT: TLM in the operational state
TS: TS checks generated CTL and does not emulate any ITS entity
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